Center for Public Policy Events

The Hobby School of Public Affairs invites you to attend the Center for Public Policy speaker events.

Hobby School of Public Affairs
Center for Public Policy Speaker Series

Upcoming Events

 

Past Events

Center for Public Policy Speaker Series (joint with the Department of Economics Macroeconomics Seminar)

Huberto M. Ennis, Economist in the Research Department of the  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Date: November 9, 2026

Time: 4:00PM-5:15PM

Location: Room 307,  T2 Building 

Paper title: The Diffusion of Bank Reserves in the U.S.

Abstract: The Federal Reserve implements monetary policy using an ample reserves system, which does not require active management of the total quantity of reserves to maintain interest rate control. The distribution and the diffusion of reserves across banks, and groups of banks, is a key factor in determining the (minimum) ample level of reserves consistent with that objective. If large portions of the outstanding amount of reserves can become effectively “trapped” in segments of the banking system, then the total level of reserves needed to achieve the intended objective may be higher. We propose a Markovian framework to study the weekly flow of reserves across groups of banks between 2010 and 2024. We group banks according to types (foreign and domestic, large and small) and Fed districts. The diffusion process depends on how reserves flow in and out of the system. We compute counterfactuals which shed light on the way the distribution of reserves would adapt to plausible changes in conditions. In general, the distribution of reserves tends to be highly persistent during periods of abundant reserves, but redistribution intensifies when reserves reach lower (yet, still ample) levels.

Political Economy Speaker Series (joint with Applied Microeconomics Seminar) 

Shanker Satyanath, Professor at the New York University

Date: November 5, 2026

Time: 11:30am

Location: Heritage Room (201), Bates Hall 

Paper title: Fascist Ideology and Migrant Labor Exploitation (with Mario Carillo-UA Barcelona and Gemma Dipoppa- Columbia)

Abstract: Forced labor is rising in advanced economies, driven largely by the exploitation of migrants. We examine its political and ideological roots. First, we assemble new data on a historical shock from the Mussolini era and show that it entrenched far-right, ethnophobic ideology in parts of Italy. We support the plausibility of this shock’s persistence using family-level surveys showing that Fascist beliefs were transmitted across generations. Second, we find that areas more exposed to the Fascist legacy exhibit higher levels of migrant forced labor today, with effects intensifying after large migrant inflows, particularly from ethnically discriminated groups. Third, exploitation is greater where Fascist propaganda was more pervasive, where institutions are controlled by far-right parties, and where societal support for the far-right is strongest. These findings underscore the political foundations of contemporary exploitative labor practices.

About the speaker: Shanker Satyanath is a professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.  He works on cross-disciplinary research in Political Science and in Economics, with papers in the Journal of Political Economy, the American Economic Review, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the American Journal of Political Science.  Having worked predominantly on the Political Economy of Conflict in the past, he has recently been focusing more on research in Historical Political Economy. 

Political Economy Speaker Series (joint with Economics and Political Science Departments)

Alexander V. Hirsch, Professor of at California Institute of Technology

Date: November 4, 2026

Time: 11:30am

Location: ARC 209 (Hines College of Architecture Bldg) 

 

Paper title: Implementing Information Escrows (with Joanna Huey)

Abstract: We use a mechanism design approach to examine information escrows in a workplace setting in which a firm seeks to minimize future managerial misconduct. In the mechanism studied, reports of misconduct are kept secret until the set of filed reports satisfies a prespecified criteria and the manager is fired. When misconduct reports are costless for employees to file, a threshold mechanism -- in which the manager is fired if and only if the number of reports exceeds a preannounced threshold -- is optimal. Costly reporting, however, can have surprising effects -- the firm may need to commit to a threshold that exceeds its ideal to elicit truthful reporting, there may be no threshold mechanism that elicits truthful reporting, and a mechanism randomizing over distinct thresholds may dominate all threshold mechanisms. These effects are rooted in the complex way that the escrow mechanism interacts with an employee's personal experience to shape her expectations that filing a report will trigger the manager's termination.

About the speaker: Alexander V. Hirsch studies policy making and political institutions using formal theory and quantitative methods, with a focus on the American context. He was an assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University from 2011 to 2014 and received a Social Science Fellowship (2012–2013) from the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton. His research has been published in the American Political Science Review, American Economic Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Political Analysis, and Journal of Public Economics. He received his BA (2003) from Yale University and PhD (2010) from the Stanford Graduate School of Business.